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National Jurisdiction and Global Business
Networks
HANNAH L. BUXBAUM*

On November 1, 2007, Professor Buxbaum delivered the ninth
annual Snyder Lecture at the University of Cambridge in the
Lauterpacht Centre for InternationalResearch.
It is a great honor for me to deliver the ninth Snyder Lecture. I have
had the pleasure of attending many of the previous lectures delivered in
Bloomington by members of the Cambridge faculty. I have also had the
pleasure of hearing from those of my students who were given the
opportunity to conduct research at the Lauterpacht Centre as Snyder
Fellows. Our faculty is very grateful for Earl Snyder's generosity in
supporting these intellectual exchanges between our schools, and I
personally am very grateful for this opportunity to address you.
I will speak today about the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts
over global business networks. There are many ways in which the
activities of U.S. courts intersect, and have long intersected, with
international business activity, and so this topic calls up in part the
procedural issues that are the bread and butter of international civil
litigation. U.S. courts regularly assert personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations on the basis of their activities in the United States; they
apply U.S. law to foreign conduct that is seen to harm certain interests
within the United States; they enforce agreements that send crossborder contract disputes over into the transnational arbitration system.
But while some of those practices are mundane and, at least in
theory, unobjectionable, others are problematic, and from time to time a
specific case or group of cases will trigger a resurgence of attention to
the role that U.S. courts play in the international arena. I would point
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to the Uranium litigation of the mid-1970s and the spate of Alien Tort
Claims Act cases that began in the mid- to late 1990s 2 as examples of
this. In this first decade of the 21st century, litigation involving
international competition and securities regulation has further fueled
concern regarding that role. The current wave of cases suggests that the
context of cross-border economic litigation has changed in several
important ways. First, as a result of the continuing increase in crossborder business activity, there is simply much more pervasive
involvement of domestic courts in the regulation of international
business, even in the ordinary functions such as establishing personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant or recognizing a foreign judgment.
Second, with the recent proliferation of non-national courts-regional,
ad-hoc, international, and also arbitral tribunals-there are new points
of overlap and conflict between their roles and the role of domestic
courts. Third, as I will argue, many of the economic injuries arising from
business activity today are properly situated at the global level. By this
I mean that they are not merely aggregations of individual localized
harms, but are enabled by the increasing connectedness and
interdependence that characterize our economic markets. Finally, both
litigants and judges are increasingly conscious of the impact that local
litigation has on global regulatory processes-and attentive to the
advantages and disadvantages of using such litigation as an instrument
of regulation.
What I would like to explore is whether these changes-particularly
the increasingly global aspect of business networks and the harms they
can cause-demand a shift in, or augmentation of, the paradigm that we
use to think about and articulate the proper role of domestic courts. I
will not argue that the global nature of business networks requires a
correspondingly global view of jurisdiction in domestic courts. Rather, I
will argue that it requires a more textured view of those courts' sphere
of engagement. In order to establish a conceptual framework for the
discussion, I borrow some concepts-in particular, the idea of scalar
analysis-from the literature on political geography. 3 That work
1. For a discussion of this litigation, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL

LAW 157-66 (1996).
2. See generally Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights
Through Domestic Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 406-08 (2001).
3. I use the word "borrow" advisedly. What follows is not an account of political
geography; it simply draws on that discipline's treatment of globalization and scale as a
useful way of situating an analysis of legal jurisdiction. For an entry into political
geography, see KEVIN R. Cox, POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY: TERRITORY, STATE, AND SOCIETY
(2002); into critical legal geography, see NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE
GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER (1994).
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provides a lens through which to consider "how the territorial extent of
a legal entity does and should compare to the scale of the problems that
it considers." 4 Political geographers therefore deal in part with the rescaling of problems in the globalized world: addressing, for instance,
ways in which "issues can potentially be rearticulated at larger scales to
mobilize political leverage." 5 Much of this work deals with the
phenomenon of scaling up. In other words, it looks at how actors
interested in achieving particular local political or social ends take
advantage of new spaces of engagement at the transnationa/global
level-perhaps by mobilizing the support of nongovernmental
organizations, or advocating regional legislation, or even by interesting
the international press-to secure them. 6 But particular issues can also
be scaled down-that is, a global problem can be recast in local terms, in
order to take advantage of local political or social resources. The concept
of scale is therefore a useful analytical tool in examining how global
economic misconduct is situated before the courts of one particular
country. In addition, the concept of scale can be used as a starting point
in considering the exploration of "new political spaces outside the
constructed boundaries of the state system." 7 Here, my project is to
examine the political space that U.S. domestic courts occupy when,
through the exercise of judicial and legislative jurisdiction, they assert
regulatory control over events and conduct that cross geographic areas.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss certain patterns of
global business activity and explain how they generate what can fairly
be described as global economic harms. I will then describe the current
paradigm that we use to define the role of domestic courts in regulating
international business and identify why in my view that paradigm
requires reexamination. Next, I will consider some particular situations
in which arguments are being made for re-envisioning the engagement
of domestic courts and analyze how these arguments, whether expressly
or implicitly, manipulate scale. Finally, I will attempt to draw some
conclusions about the conditions under which the global engagement of
domestic courts might be successful.

4. Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas From Property
and CriminalLaw, 53 VILL. L. REv. 117, 148 (2008).
5. Hfvard Haarstad & Arnt Floysand, Globalization and the Power of Rescaled
Narratives: A Case of Opposition to Mining in Tambodgrande, Peru, 26 POL. GEOGRAPHY
289, 293 (2007)

6. See Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of
Scale, or: Looking for Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1, 7 (1998).

7. Haarstad & Floysand, supra note 5, at 293.
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I. CROSS-BORDER BUSINESS NETWORKS AND
GLOBAL ECONOMIC HARM

The phrase "business network" can be used to describe many
different constellations of activity. These include the range of operations
conducted by the typical corporate conglomerate through a web of
affiliated companies; business activities carried out on the Internet, to
invoke perhaps the archetypical network example; and a cartel network
formed by a series of price-fixing agreements among companies. I use
the word "network" to indicate the web of contact points with multiple
jurisdictions that such activity entails, with respect both to the conduct
that constitutes it and to its consequences.
To a significant degree, the problem of regulating business networks
has become global in scale. Consider the activities of a price-fixing
cartel, in which companies from a number of different countries enter
into pricing arrangements that artificially elevate the price of their
goods in markets around the world. It is possible, and I will return to
this point, to characterize the result simply as an aggregation of many
localized harms (overcharges in the United States, overcharges in
England, overcharges in each market in which transactions took place).
Yet it is the global aspect of the cartel's strategy that makes it
successful. Where the goods in question are fungible, the price-fixing
must take place on all markets; otherwise, it could be avoided through
arbitrage. It is therefore the networking of the cartel's actions at the
global level that enables the scheme, and so, I would argue, it is the
networking that a successful regulatory strategy must address.
Consider also the insolvency of a multinational corporate enterprise,
with assets, debtors and creditors scattered around the world. It is
possible to address that insolvency through an aggregation of local
bankruptcy proceedings conducted under national bankruptcy lawsone in each country in which assets of that enterprise are located. Yet
without a global plan to identify all assets and to ensure that all
creditors are treated similarly, no fair distribution can take place-and
certainly the reorganization of that enterprise would be difficult. Here,
then, the goal of equitable distribution of an insolvent enterprise's
assets has shifted up to the global level.
What these examples are intended to illustrate is simply that the
fact of globalization in the business world enables certain harms and
creates certain regulatory challenges that are situated at the global
level. This argues for scaling the regulation of such networks up to the
global level as well.
Within the legislative arena, in thinking about how to regulate
global economic activity, the idea of scale is already deployed in very
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explicit ways-most prominently through the principles of subsidiarity
(in the EU) and federalism (in the United States). Article 5 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, for instance, states that
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 8
Protocol 30 to the EC Treaty, in fleshing out this principle, dictates
attention to whether "the issue under consideration has transnational
aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member
States," and, again, to whether "action at Community level would
produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects compared with
action at the level of the Member States." 9 Similarly, under the
principles of economic federalism that guide regulatory approaches in
the United States, regulation is expected as a general matter to take
place at the most decentralized level possible, unless particular
externalities demand that it be shifted up to a more centralized level.' 0
Now, in both the United States and the European Union the
relevant concept is often used with the protection of local prerogatives
in mind. In other words, under both subsidiarity and federalism, the
preference is to maintain regulation at as decentralized a level as
possible. But in view of the shifting scale of economic conduct and
effects, the tendency in practice has been to move up levels of regulation
through increased federal regulation in the U.S. (where, certainly, the
deference that economic federalism has created to the central
government is substantial) and through increased Community
regulation in Europe. That tendency can be seen elsewhere as well-in
multilateral
standardizing instruments such as international
accounting and disclosure standards, in multilateral treaties (such as
TRIPs), or in the mandate of the World Trade Organization.

8. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
reprinted in Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on the European Union and of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 42.
9. Protocol (No. 30) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
Proportionality (1997), 2006 O.J. (C 321) 309.
10. See generally Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J.
ECON. PERSP. 43, 45 (1997).
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Beyond these general precepts of legislative structure, the question
of scale also receives attention in particular substantive contexts. In
environmental regulation, for instance, there is a robust literature on
"jurisdictional mismatch."" Some advocates promote the matching
principle, which maintains that "in general, the size of the geographic
area affected by a specific pollution source should determine the
appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution."'12 The
principle of scale is thus often offered as an argument for restraining
federal regulation, but, with reference to certain cross-border harms like
climate change, it is turned by some to justify shifts of regulation to
13
higher, or multiple, levels.
By contrast, the concept of scale does not figure as explicitly in
analysis of the role of courts in regulating global activity.' 4 Instead, in
my view, that analysis is conducted within one very specific paradigm:
an international relations paradigm.
II. COURTS

AS GLOBAL REGULATORS AND THE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PARADIGM

The dominant paradigm used to consider the role of domestic courts
does not focus on how the activity of those courts relates to the scale of
the problems they address. Rather, it focuses on how the activity of
national courts as governmental actors relates to the activity of other
governmental actors-in other words, it focuses on whether the exercise
of jurisdiction by a particular court interferes with the authority of
courts or governments in other jurisdictions.
This orientation is reflected in the narrative that has emerged as
U.S. courts engage in the global arena-a narrative that has United
States courts involving themselves more and more aggressively in
international matters, and other countries attempting to assert their
own sovereignty in order to check that aggression. This story plays out
in analysis of virtually every aspect of judicial engagement. So, for
instance, with the obtaining of evidence abroad: the story is of
aggressive pretrial discovery orders by U.S. courts that violate the
11. For a framing of the problem in those terms, see William W. Buzbee, Recognizing
the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IowA L. REV. 1, 23 (2003).
12. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle:
The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POLY REV.
23, 25 (1996).
13. See Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation:Implications for
Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789, 1800-01 (2005), and
sources cited at note 36 therein.
14. Apart from one limited context: in connection with the creation of the few
supranational courts that address particular international issues such as human rights.
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"judicial sovereignty" of other nations. So also with the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over foreign companies, not just in lawsuits arising
out of their specific contacts with the forum, but also on the basis simply
that they do a certain level of business there. So also with the
application of U.S. economic law to conduct taking place in other
countries. (This is a narrative that hardly needs explication here;
England has been a perennial objector to the activity of U.S. courts in
the area of international antitrust enforcement.) 15 Thus, whatever the
specific jurisdictional question at stake-and some relate to legislative
jurisdiction, some to enforcement jurisdiction, some to personal
jurisdiction over foreign entities-when we consider the action of a
domestic court and its role in interpreting and applying particular
jurisdictional standards, we see it through the lens of international
relations, looking at the authority of the court vis-A-vis that of other
states.
That paradigm is one that aims at containment and confinementat bounding the exercise of judicial authority. This is of course
consistent with its theoretical foundation, which is in the notion of
territorial sovereignty as not only the source of power but also the
constraint on power that ensures an orderly and fair distribution of
authority within the international arena. 16 For that reason, and to
restate this orientation in terms of scale, the paradigm has a very
localizing focus, intended to keep domestic courts embedded within the
national political system. In my view, this orientation does not capture
very well the reality of the much messier interactions between national
courts and global business networks. I therefore wish to examine the
assumptions underpinning the international relations paradigm, and
their consequences for how we view the regulatory activity of domestic
courts, by bringing scale more explicitly to the forefront.
If we consider, as directed by this paradigm, whether U.S. domestic
courts are acting within the sphere of their authority, how should we
define that sphere? What is the political (governmental) space within
which U.S. courts operate?17 It is bounded, first, by federalism.
Constitutional and statutory rules define a certain sphere for federal
courts as apart from state courts (in the form partly of their limited

15. See A. Vaughan Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Practice, 50
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELS J.
FOREIGN & INTL. PRIVATE L.] 157 (1988).
16. See Frederick A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111
RECUEIL DES COURS [COLLECTED COURSES] 1, 30 (1964-1).

17. I will answer that question with respect to federal courts, as many cases involving
citizens of different countries, and most cases brought under economic regulatory laws,
are heard in the federal system.
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subject-matter jurisdiction, in contrast to the unlimited jurisdiction of
state courts). They are also very connected to the states in which they
sit, because they are required, in many cases, to apply the substantive
law of those states. In addition, their space of engagement is bounded by
doctrines flowing from the separation of powers. Although judicial
authority to decide cases or controversies properly presented is not
constitutionally eliminated when those cases touch on foreign relations,
the political question doctrine and doctrines of deference to the
executive in matters of foreign affairs are tools that are used to limit
judicial activity in such cases. Thus, speaking generally, the
constitutional separation of powers defines a certain sphere for U.S.
courts as set apart from other U.S. actors-other branches of the federal
government. These limitations in sum can be seen as creating the
political space of engagement of domestic courts.
Even with respect to their engagement with international law, U.S.
courts take their frame of reference from the domestic Constitution.
U.S. domestic courts do of course act as part of the international legal
order-for instance, by interpreting and applying treaty rules-but in
the U.S. system international law is seen, as reflected in its positioning
within the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, as part of foreign
affairs, which is constructed as a matter of domestic law. 18 For that
reason, as to this aspect of their engagement, U.S. courts do not share a
common frame of reference with courts of other countries.
I draw two conclusions from this review. First: the international
relations paradigm, particularly as it is filtered through U.S.
constitutional law, is a very locally directed one. Second, and following
from the first, the vision of scale it supports is one in which domestic
courts handle only domestic problems, to avoid infringing on the
authority of other nations. Thus, presumably, we would need regional
courts to address regional problems, and international tribunals to
address international problems. However, lacking such institutions to
deal with the regulation of global business networks, and despite the
construction of the political space of operation for the federal courts,
U.S. courts are nevertheless being drawn into a different space of
engagement by the various forms of global business that generate
litigation. This suggests the need to rethink our conception of the proper
role for domestic courts.

18. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality and the Resolution of
JurisdictionalConflict, 57 AM. J. CoMP. L. 631, 643-52 (2009) (describing the minor role
played by international law in the U.S. approach to legislative jurisdiction in the antitrust

context).
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III. EXPANDING THE ENGAGEMENT OF U.S. COURTS
In considering changes in the scope of domestic courts' engagement,
I would like to mention but then set aside one strand of the relevant
literature, which addresses how U.S. courts themselves increasingly see
their activity as taking place within a larger cooperative network. 19
What I will focus on instead is how other actors-those who are engaged
in global business networks or harmed by them-are forcing the
expanded engagement of domestic courts. That is, I want to look at how
the various actors invested in the goals of global business regulation,
including activists, legislative reformers, and plaintiffs seeking recovery
for harm suffered, are attempting to create a broader area of
engagement for domestic courts through methods that rescale
regulatory challenges. I will do that by exploring examples of litigation
in three different areas: competition, insolvency, and securities
regulation.
A. Litigation to Enforce Competition Law
In a series of cases culminating in one heard by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2004,20 U.S. courts considered private actions arising out of the
conduct of global price-fixing cartels. The cartels in question had
affected U.S. markets, and U.S. purchasers had already sued on the
basis of the resulting harm. However, these particular actions were
initiated by foreign plaintiffs, who had purchased the price-fixed goods
on foreign markets. Their arguments that U.S. courts should
nevertheless have jurisdiction over these claims, and that U.S. antitrust
law should apply to them, hinged on the global nature of the harm
caused by the cartels.
In the case that eventually reached the Supreme Court, which
involved the activities of a global vitamins cartel, 21 the aim of the
proposed regulatory strategy emerged particularly clearly in some of the
amicus briefs submitted to the Court. 22 These suggested that the cartel's
cross-border arrangements required cross-border regulatory solutions.
That argument was cast in very scale-sensitive terms; it noted that the

19. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INTL L. 1103,
1113-15 (2000); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
TransnationalJudicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO.
L.J. 487, 491-97 (2005).
20. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Brief for Joseph E. Stiglitz & Peter R. Orszag as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724).
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economic markets for certain products are not separable along
geographic lines, and drew the conclusion that regulatory efforts too
must be directed at a more broadly defined market. Amici argued that
permitting foreign plaintiffs to sue in the United States-not only for
harm suffered in U.S.-based transactions, but also for harm suffered in
foreign purchase transactions-would achieve optimal global deterrence
levels. This conclusion rested on the proposition that the treble damages
available in U.S. litigation would raise the total damages payable by the
23
cartel to an amount sufficient to achieve deterrence.
This argument quite consciously considered the regulatory benefit to
all markets-to global markets-that would result. For example, the
economic data supporting the plaintiffs' argument drew on the
regulatory gaps created by the situation in developing countries, where
insufficient antitrust regimes may leave anticompetitive conduct
entirely unregulated. 24 The arguments specifically noted that the
benefits of enhanced deterrence would ensure better regulation of
markets everywhere. In other words, they perceived the proposed
regulatory solution as one that would enhance the enforcement of a
25
shared standard of conduct for the benefit of consumers worldwide.
To this point, the argument looks like one that is scaling up, by
highlighting the global nature of the regulatory challenge. But there is
no global competition law, and no supranational competition tribunal.
Thus, in order to engage U.S. domestic courts, the argument had to be
scaled down, because under the relevant competition law, the plaintiffs
could sustain their claims only if they brought the conduct within the
legislative jurisdiction of the United States by establishing that it had
caused harm there. 26 Therefore, they argued that global underdeterrence would cause harm within the United States, because it would
lead to continued cartel activity there, thereby triggering a local
regulatory interest. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It
assumed that the cartel's effects on U.S. markets were independent of
those it caused on foreign markets. 27 It then held that because the harm
suffered by foreign purchasers arose from the conduct's foreign effects,
and not from its domestic effects, the claims did not meet the law's
28
jurisdictional requirements.

23. Id. at 8.
24. Id. at 11-12.
25. Id. at 9-13.
26. 542 U.S. at 158 ('The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA)
excludes from the Sherman Act's reach much anticompetitive conduct that causes only
foreign injury.").
27. Id. at 164.
28. Id. at 159.
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What interests me about this litigation is how the court retreated
into its "natural" space of engagement, as shaped by the international
relations paradigm. It did not really engage the substance of the
plaintiffs' argument regarding global under-deterrence; rather, it cited
the need to avoid interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations. 29 It also cited the need to avoid inadvertent interference with
the actions of the U.S. executive pursuant to amnesty programs
designed to expose cartels. 30 In other words, in the end, the strategy of
scaling the problem down-attempting to bring this issue within the
ambit of national jurisdiction in order to mobilize U.S. judicial
resources-was not a productive approach. In my view, it failed in part
because, by recasting what was clearly a global problem (global underdeterrence) as a local one (harm to U.S. markets), 31 it came up against
the fundamental restraint of the international relations paradigm-the
notion that local courts should focus on local issues. It did not
successfully create an alternative framework within which the court
might have seen local harm as intertwined with global harm, and seen
its own task as sharing in a coordinated scheme of enforcement rather
than competing with foreign courts or governments.
B. InternationalInsolvency
National bankruptcy laws, which are applied by domestic
bankruptcy or general courts, are most effective in resolving the
insolvency of firms whose assets and creditors are located in a single
jurisdiction. In bankruptcy proceedings contained entirely within one
country, the local policies reflected in rules on priority of distribution,
the enforceability of security interests, and so forth do not come into
conflict with competing policies. The increase in multinational
enterprises, however, and the corresponding increase in bankruptcies
with cross-border dimensions, has shifted the challenge of addressing
many business bankruptcies beyond the local plane. Domestic courts
struggle with their inability to enforce local law against a company's
foreign assets, or with the consequences of applying disparate
distribution rules to similarly situated creditors based simply on their
location. The predominant method for dealing with such challenges in
practice has been "territoriality," an approach under which multiple
local proceedings may be opened, one in each of the jurisdictions in

29. Id. at 164-65.
30. Id. at 169.
31. A recasting necessitated by the FIAIA; see supra note 26.
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which assets of the insolvent company are located. 32 That approach is
consonant with the international relations paradigm, as it seeks to
avoid one court's exercise of authority in ways that would undermine
foreign interests.
In recent years, however, there has been movement toward
expanding the space of engagement for local courts, prompted not by
litigants, but by legislatures. Most prominent among reform efforts is
the 1997 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 33 This
instrument does not replace local bankruptcy law, but draws courts'
attention to insolvency as a global issue. Article 25 of that model law
states that "[a bankruptcy] court shall cooperate to the maximum extent
possible with foreign courts or foreign representatives," and provides
that the court is entitled to communicate directly with them. The law
goes further in putting "hard" forms of cooperation in place as well: in
Article 27 it states that "Cooperation ...may be implemented by any
appropriate means, including.. .coordination of the administration and
supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs; approval or
implementation by courts of agreements concerning the coordination of
proceedings; [and] coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding the
same debtor."
This legislation thus scales bankruptcy administration up,
expanding the space of engagement for domestic bankruptcy courts. It
invites them to consider insolvency regulation as a global process rather
than one that focuses on the local treatment of local assets, and it
creates room for cross-border creditor groups to argue for the most
globally effective strategy of distribution or reorganization. Within this
framework, courts have in some cross-border cases entered into joint
protocols with their counterparts in other jurisdictions, creating the
foundation for shared plans of distribution that reconcile inconsistent
laws on the treatment of particular claims in bankruptcy.3 4 To take an
35
English example, consider the Maxwell Communications bankruptcy.
There, the Justice
presiding over Maxwell Communication
32. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International
Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2219 (2000).
33. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER

INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE To ENACTMENT, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
insolven/insolvency-e.pdf.
34. For an up-to-date summary of such cases, see Draft UNCITRAL Notes on
Cooperation, Communication and Coordination in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings,
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group V, Thirty-sixth
session, March 13, 2009, at 93-108.
35. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking InternationalInsolvency: The Neglected Role
of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 23, 36 (2000) (describing the
Maxwell bankruptcy process).
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Corporation's full insolvency in England, and the U.S. judge hearing full
reorganization proceedings in the United States, with the assistance of
the administrators and the examiner they respectively appointed,
formulated a Protocol intended to guide the bankruptcy administration.
That Protocol provided the framework for reconciling the U.S. plan of
reorganization and the U.K. scheme of arrangement in a way that
harmonized inconsistent provisions of the two countries' laws. Thus, the
new paradigm enabled the courts to look beyond the local, in a way that
enhanced rather than overstepped their authority.
Although some such cases, including the Maxwell Communications
case, were decided before the final adoption of the Model Law in 1997, it
is clear that even those were shaped by preliminary work on that
instrument, which in turn built on previous legislative efforts to
coordinate the work of courts in handling international bankruptcies. In
the insolvency example, then, the expansion of the scale of judicial
engagement was grounded in legislation, in the form of local laws
implementing the UNCITRAL model. That is, courts were granted
specific authority to engage with actors outside their own jurisdiction in
order to solve the global aspects of cross-border insolvencies. In this
regard, of course, it differs significantly from the competition law
example, where the potential exercise of authority by U.S. courts was
seen as highly problematic. Thus, one tentative conclusion consistent
with the "natural" sphere of engagement of U.S. courts, shaped by
deference to the executive branch and to the competing policies of other
countries, might simply be that a formal, bilaterally or multilaterally
negotiated space of global engagement is required in order to legitimate
the expansion of judicial authority.
To complicate that conclusion, though, I would like to address one
last example, from the area of securities litigation.
C. Securities Litigation
Like competition law, U.S. securities law may be applied by
domestic courts only to conduct that triggers a U.S. regulatory
interest-because it occurs within the United States, for instance, or
because its effects are felt there. Yet much securities activity is global:
companies list their securities on multiple markets, and investors seek
out foreign as well as domestic opportunities. As a result, much
securities fraud has a global aspect, since the public release of
information in one country can, by virtue of the linked capital and
information
markets,
affect
prices
in
multiple
jurisdictions
simultaneously. Increasingly frequently, then, U.S. courts must
consider claims with significant cross-border aspects, as well as the
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nature of their own role in addressing a problem of global scale.
Although not always consistently, U.S. courts have on the whole
remained within a local sphere of engagement in this area, as the
jurisdictional standards they apply are tied to the points of contact
between the fraud in question and the United States. As in the
competition context, however, they have been pushed toward a more
global frame of reference by litigants seeking access to U.S. courts,
including foreign investors seeking compensation for losses suffered in
connection with foreign investment transactions. 36 And, unlike in the
competition context, courts have shown more willingness to engage in
new ways with efforts to regulate this kind of global securities fraud. I
will discuss as an illustration of this shift the issue of personal
jurisdiction over certain secondary defendants such as accounting firms.
Because establishing personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant is
the gateway to potential application of U.S. securities laws in litigation
against it, the approach of domestic courts to this question is an
indicator of their willingness to participate in the regulation of
securities fraud on the global plane.
Establishing personal jurisdiction over foreign secondary defendants
in U.S. securities litigation is often much more difficult than
establishing personal jurisdiction over a foreign issuer, as those
defendants may not have engaged in activity within, or directed toward,
the United States sufficient to satisfy our due process requirements.
The acts that would constitute fraud by such entities typically occur
37
outside the United States, making specific jurisdiction unavailable.
And general jurisdiction over a foreign legal entity can be maintained
only if it has engaged in systematic and continuous business activities
within the United States, 38 which is unlikely in the case of foreign
secondary defendants such as accounting firms or underwriters. Thus,
traditional jurisdictional analysis would tend to situate securities
litigation against such entities at the local scale. In some cases,
however, courts have extended general jurisdiction over foreign entities
by adopting a theory of the global enterprise.
In a few recent cases, courts have addressed the question whether
foreign accounting firms can be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
36. For a treatment of such cases, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class
Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNA'L L. 14 (2007).

37. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (transactions in the
forum state are sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in claims arising out of those
transactions).
38. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984)
(discussing the systematic nature of business activity within the forum necessary to
support general jurisdiction).
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United States as a result of their membership in a global enterprise. In
one representative case, plaintiffs alleged that several Bermuda
entities, including local affiliates of Ernst & Young, had engaged in
securities fraud through their actions as fund administrators and
auditors. 39 This required the court to consider personal jurisdiction over
those firms, which is the gateway to applying U.S. securities law to the
claims against them. The firms stressed the absence of contacts with the
United States, noting that they had no business offices, employees or
bank accounts there, and suggested that they interacted only
sporadically with U.S. sister offices. 40 The court rejected this
characterization on the basis of an extensive review of the business
model adopted by Ernst & Young worldwide. It described the group's
strategy of global integration; its advertising strategy; and, at length,
the group's marketing materials, which suggested that by using Ernst &
Young's Bermuda affiliates a client would obtain the expertise of the
global Ernst & Young group. 41 In sum, the court concluded, "each of [the
Bermuda] defendants functions as an integrated member of the
international Ernst & Young enterprise." Thus, it held, the plaintiffs
had established a prima facie showing of general jurisdiction over each
42
of the entities.
This and similar cases reflect a scaling up of the jurisdictional
analysis in response to the global scale of the enterprises themselves.
Another court described this shift in scale particularly clearly, in a case
involving the KPMG accounting group:
There can be no doubt that KPMG offices are integral
parts of a single global enterprise that conducts business
in the United States. That KPMG UK deliberately
markets and promotes itself as part of an integrated
global network severely undercuts its present attempt to
divest itself of a relationship with that network in order
43
to defeat the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
That move in turn opens a channel for the involvement of domestic
courts in regulating the conduct of those enterprises through the
application of U.S. law.
39. Cromer Finance Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

40. Id. at 476-77.
41. Id. at 475-79.

42. Id.
43. Rocker Management, L.L.C. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V., 2005 WL
3658006, *7 (D.N.J. 2005). The court concluded that general jurisdiction could be

sustained over KPMG UK.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

I began by suggesting the need to explore whether changes in global
business activity demand a shift in, or augmentation of, the paradigm
that we use to think about the role of national courts in the global
arena. There has been implicit in this discussion, I hope, a normative
inclination toward encouraging a wider sphere of engagement for
national courts. I would like to conclude by making that explicit.
I have great sympathy for the international relations paradigm as
used to shape the behavior of domestic courts, and would like to quote
one of my favorite passages on this point, from Richard Falk (writing in
1964):
No service is rendered to international law when
officials act upon the pretense that a shared community
of policy, interest, and value underlies the contemporary
network of global relations and is hence available for
implementation by each national actor. This pretension
supports the treatment of national policy, interest, and
value as if they were universal. Such behavior invites
retaliation, engenders distrust, and undermines those
actual and potential claims of international law to make
stable the relations among the entire community of
44
states.
But is it always a pretense to suggest that we have a shared
community of policy, interest and value, particularly in the area of
economic regulation? In a world in which the ongoing incidence of
securities fraud is seen to jeopardize the value of billions of dollars in
pension funds; in which the activities of price-fixing cartels not only
harm consumers worldwide but threaten the economic growth of
developing countries; 45 in which national laws, self-regulation and
nonbinding codes combined are still perceived as inadequate to stem the
misconduct of multinational enterprises? I think that point deserves
reconsideration. I would not suggest that we leap toward a fully global
vision of jurisdiction in domestic courts. The values of fairness and
stability that are so central to the international relations paradigm, and
that oftentimes stand in opposition to regulatory exigencies, must be

44. RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

ORDER 6 (1964).

45. See generally OECD, Hard Core Cartels: Third report on the implementation of the
1998 Council Recommendation, availableat http://www.oecd.org.

NATIONAL JURISDICTION AND GLOBAL BUSINESS NETWORKS

181

preserved even as new regulatory strategies emerge. 46 Rather, I suggest
that we must consider more carefully the ways in which larger spaces of
engagement are already opening for domestic courts, and explore more
fully the conditions under which their occupation of those spaces might
become productive.

46. I discuss this tension in greater detail in Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational
Regulatory Litigation,46 VA. J. INT'L L. 251, 297-305 (2006).

